


















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1813 










An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 









This paper presents a New Keynesian model that dwells on the role of banks in the cost 
channel of monetary policy. Banks extend loans to firms in an environment of monopolistic 
competition by setting the loan rate according to a Calvo-type staggered price setting 
approach, which means that the adjustment of the aggregate loan rate to a monetary policy 
shock is sticky. We estimate the model for the Euro area by adopting a minimum distance 
approach. Our findings exhibit that, first, frictions on the loan market influence the 
propagation of monetary policy shocks as the pass-through of a change in the money market 
rate to the loan rate is incomplete, and, second, the cost channel is operating, but the effect is 
weak since inflation is driven by real unit labor costs rather than the loan rate. Our main 
conclusion is that the strength of the cost channel is mitigated as banks shelter firms from 
monetary policy shocks by smoothing lending rates. 
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In the cost channel, banks play a pivotal role in the transmission of monetary
policy, which stems from the notion that ¯rms depend on credit to ¯nance pro-
duction (Barth and Ramey, 2000, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1997 and
2005, Chowdhury, Ho®mann and Scharbert, 2006, Rabanal, 2003, Ravenna and
Walsh, 2006). Firms relate their pricing decision to credit conditions as their
marginal production costs are directly a®ected by interest rates. Hence, a mone-
tary contraction puts upward pressure on prices by deteriorating credit conditions
through higher interest rates.
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Ravenna and Walsh (2006)
present a New Keynesian model that incorporates the cost channel besides the
interest rate channel { i.e. the traditional aggregate demand channel { which states
that prices decline immediately after a monetary contraction because of the pro{
cyclical drop in output and unit labor costs. As the cost channel is counteracting
the interest rate channel, this implies that the reaction of prices to a monetary
policy shock is mitigated, while the response of output is reinforced. Although,
banks are considered in this framework explicitly, the scope of their behavior is
limited as they only act as neutral conveyors of monetary policy actions.
This paper presents a New Keynesian model that dwells on the role of banks in
the cost channel of monetary policy. Banks are assumed to extend loans to ¯rms
in an environment of monopolistic competition by setting the loan rate according
to a Calvo{type staggered price setting approach. In this setup, only a random
fraction of banks adjusts their loan rate to a change in the policy rate { that
determines the marginal costs { while the remaining fraction leaves their loan
rate unchanged, which means that the adjustment of the aggregate loan rate to
a monetary policy shock is sticky. This is in contrast to Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1997, 2005) and Ravenna and Walsh (2006), who focus primarily on
banks operating costlessly under perfect competition with the consequence that
the loan rate always equals the policy rate.
Our motivation stems from the empirical ¯nding for the Euro area that the
pass{through from money market rates to loan rates is incomplete in the short{
2run (de Bondt, 2005).1 Using a vector autoregressive (VAR) model, we con¯rm
this ¯nding by showing that the adjustment of the loan rate to a monetary policy
shock is delayed and less pronounced. The degree to which the reaction of loan
rates to changes in money market rates is incomplete crucially depends on the
structure of the ¯nancial system (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994).
Ehrmann et al. (2001) provide ample evidence for the Euro area that the de-
gree of monopolistic competition in the loan market is high. Market imperfections
can be explained by the existence of long{term relationships between banks and
customers, which are typical for a bank{based ¯nancial system as opposed to a
market{based ¯nancial system.2 In a customer market, the detachment of imper-
sonal competitive forces is replaced by banker{customer relationships. Fried and
Howitt (1980) and Berger and Udell (1992) argue that the bene¯t from banker{
customer relationships { that are predominately continuous { arises from banks
o®ering an implicit interest rate insurance to risk{averse customers by keeping
loan rates less variable than market rates. This means that loan rates are sticky
with the consequence that the pass{through from changes in money market rates
to loan rates is incomplete. Customers compensate the banks for bearing the risk
of changing money market rates by accepting loan rates that are on average higher
than market rates. In contrast, a market{based ¯nancial system is characterized
by ¯nancial markets that prevail a relative high degree of competition with the
consequence that the interest rate pass{through is more complete.
Following Barth and Ramey (2000) who show that after a restrictive monetary
policy shock the price/wage ratio in many U.S. industries increases in a VAR, a
number of studies have explored whether the cost channel is relevant for the
transmission of monetary impulses. One strand of the literature uses partial
equilibrium approaches by estimating single Phillips curve equations that account
for a direct e®ect of the nominal interest rate on in°ation. Ravenna and Walsh
(2006) ¯nd supporting evidence for the existence of a cost channel in the U.S.
Chowdhury, Ho®mann, and Schabert (2006) estimate Phillips curves for the G{7
1See also de Bondt (2005) for a comprehensive survey of the empirical ¯ndings reported in
related work.
2As our model set{up below assumes that capital is constant and therefore abstains from
the need to ¯nance risky investment projects, more popular explanations for maintaining tight
long{term relationships such as asymmetric information costs or switching costs cannot be used.
3countries and ¯nd that the cost channel is relevant in the U.S. and the U.K.,
but not in Germany and in Japan, which possibly indicates that the structure of
the ¯nancial system { a market{based system versus a bank{based system { has
an impact on the consequences of monetary policy actions. Another strand of
the literature draws on general equilibrium approaches that account for both, the
cost channel and the interest rate channel. Rabanal (2003) estimates his model
for the U.S. and the Euro area using a Bayesian approach. Although his ¯ndings
display that the cost channel is operating, the e®ect is quantitatively insigni¯cant,
which renders it irrelevant for monetary policymaking. Using a minimum distance
estimation, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) reach a similar conclusion
for the U.S. and state that the role of the cost channel in their model is only
minor.
Our paper belongs to the second strand of the literature. Following Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), we
estimate our general equilibrium model for the Euro area by adopting a minimum
distance approach, which matches the theoretical impulse responses to the em-
pirical responses of an estimated VAR model to a monetary policy shock. Our
results exhibit that (i) frictions on the loan market { and hence banker{customer
relationships { play an important part in the propagation of monetary policy
shocks as the reaction of loan rates to a change in money market rates is sluggish,
and (ii) the cost channel is operating, but the e®ect is weak since the response
of in°ation to a monetary policy shock is dominated by the reaction of real unit
labor costs rather than interest rates.
The main implication of our results is that the strength of the cost channel
is mitigated as banks shelter ¯rms from monetary policy shocks by smoothing
lending rates. Even though ¯rms base their pricing decision on credit conditions,
the impact on in°ation dynamics arising through changes in interest rates emerges
as quantitatively unimportant.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the model is set out. While
households and ¯rms behave as in the standard New Keynesian framework with
habit formation, sticky prices and rule-of-thumb price setters, an additional fric-
tion enters the model through the banking industry. Section 3 estimates the
parameters of the model by using a minimum distance approach. In Section
44, the relevance of the structure of the banking system for the cost channel is
discussed. Section 5 summarizes the main ¯ndings and concludes.
2 The Model
We present a New Keynesian model in which banks extent loans to ¯rms by
setting the loan rate in an environment of monopolistic competition according
to a Calvo{type staggered price setting approach. The model builds on Gali,
Gertler, and Lopez{Salido (2001), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)
and Ravenna and Walsh (2006), but yields richer implications for the evolution
of the loan rate.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households, indexed by j 2 (0;1), deciding on consump-







where Et¡1 denotes the expectation operator, conditional on aggregate and house-
hold j's information up to { and including { time t¡1, and ¯ 2 (0;1) is a discount











where Cj;t is household j's consumption in period t, »t is a taste shock, ¾ is the
coe±cient of relative risk aversion, Nj;t is household j's labor supply, ´ is the
elasticity of marginal disutility of labor, Mj;t=Pt are real cash balances, and º is
the elasticity of marginal utility of money. Ht denotes an external habit variable
which depends positively on consumption of the aggregate household sector in
period t ¡ 1, Ht = hCt¡1.
3The assumption that the household's decisions for time t and later are taken on the basis
of the information set in time t ¡ 1 implies that decisions for time t are predetermined. This
is consistent with the identifying restrictions of the VAR model considered below, according to
which output and in°ation are prevented from responding contemporaneously to a monetary
policy shock.
5Households maximize their expected lifetime utility (1) by choosing optimal
consumption subject to an intertemporal budget constraint:
PtCj;t + Dj;t + Mj;t = Mj;t¡1 + WtNj;t + R
D
t¡1Dj;t¡1 + ¦j;t; (3)
where Dj;t are deposits hold at banks at the gross deposit rate RD
t , Wt is the nom-
inal wage rate, and ¦j;t are aggregate pro¯ts from the ¯rms and banks distributed
at the end of period t.














where the Lagrange multiplier on the intertemporal budget constraint ¸j;t de-
notes household j's marginal utility of consumption. We assume that ¯nancial
markets are complete, and that households insure themselves against all idiosyn-
cratic risk. Thus, households are homogeneous with respect to consumption and
asset holdings, implying that the ¯rst{order conditions are equal for all households
(Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005).
2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Final Good Producers
The ¯nal good Yt which is entirely used for consumption Ct is produced by a
continuum of wholesale producers in an environment of perfect competition. Final
goods are bundles of di®erentiated goods Yj;t which are provided by a continuum
of monopolistically competitive intermediate good producers. The technology to










where ² > 1 governs the price elasticity of demand for the individual goods. The
optimal allocation of households' expenditure across di®erentiated goods implies






Yt; for all j 2 (0;1); (7)










2.2.2 Intermediate Good Producers
Firms indexed by j 2 (0;1) produce a continuum of goods in monopolistically
competitive markets. The production function of a ¯rm is given by:
Yj;t = At(Nj;t)
®; (9)
where Nj;t is employment, ® is the output elasticity with respect to labor, and At
is an aggregate technology shock.
Firms face price frictions as in Calvo (1983), which implies a staggered price
setting. The price level Pt evolves each period as a weighted average of a fraction
of ¯rms µ that stick with last periods price level Pt¡1 and a fraction of ¯rms 1¡µ
that are allowed to change prices:
P
1¡²





Prices that are reset in the current period P ¤
t can be decomposed into a compo-
nent 1¡! resulting from optimizing (forward-looking) ¯rms and a component !





























subject to households' aggregate demand given by equation (7). Share holders
to which pro¯ts are redeemed discount cash °ows in i periods to come with a
7stochastic factor equal to µi¢i;t+i, where ¢i;t+i denotes the intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution of a representative household. Again we assume that pricing
decisions occur prior to the realization of any aggregate time t disturbance. Time










where 'j;t+i are the real marginal cost. The solution to the optimization problem




















Yt+i = 0; (15)
where P
f
j;t is the optimal price of forward-looking ¯rm j.
The ¯rm rents labor in perfectly competitive markets. Pro¯ts are distributed
to households at the end of each period. As each ¯rm is obliged to pay the wage
bill in advance of production, it has to take up loans from a bank at the beginning
of each period amounting to WtNj;t. Repayment by the ¯rm occurs at the end of
each period at the gross lending rate RL
j;t. Production costs of ¯rm j are therefore
given by RL
j;tWtNj;t. Cost minimization implies that its real marginal costs at















where wt = Wt=Pt is the real wage and Sj;t are real unit labor costs. When
the production is subject to diminishing returns to scale (® < 1) and when ¯rms
maintain long{term business relationships with speci¯c banks, ¯rms with di®erent
production levels face di®erent marginal costs. Relating 'j;t+i to average real










which is derived in detail in Appendix A. Note that 1=³ measures the degree
of monopoly power in the banking sector, and hence the importance of banker{
customer relationships.
82.3 Banks
The individual bank j, which operates in an environment that is characterized by









where ³ > 1 is the interest rate elasticity of demand for the individual loan, and
RL
j;t is the gross interest rate of the loan Lj;t provided by bank j. This function
is similar to the households' demand for goods. Unlike equation (7), however,
the ¯rms' demand for loans is postulated and not derived algebraically from mi-
crofounded behavior similar to the bundling approach described in Section 2.2.1.
The reason for this is as follows. While the representative household's ¯nal con-
sumption good is modeled as a bundle of di®erentiated intermediate goods, which
is produced by perfectly competitive ¯nal good producers, a ¯rm that depends on
credit to ¯nance production in a bank{based ¯nancial system is assumed to main-
tain a long{term relationship with a particular bank. In other words, the ¯rm's
credit portfolio is not diversi¯ed over all banks supplying loans in the market,
so that the bundling approach is inapplicable. Notwithstanding this structural
di®erence, which excludes the modeling of a \¯nal loan sector", equation (18)
is a loan demand function that applies to a customer market (Rotemberg and
Woodford, 1991). In such a setting the parameter ³ can be interpreted as the
¯rm's willingness to give up the business relationship with the bank in the event
of changing loan rates. The higher ³, the looser become the ties between the bank
and the customer and the more the structure of the loan market resembles perfect
competition.4
Loan rate stickiness is introduced by assuming that banks operating in a cus-
tomer market face nominal frictions as in Calvo (1983). Each bank resets its loan
rate only with a probability 1¡¿ each period, independently of the time elapsed
since the last adjustment. Thus, each period a fraction 1 ¡¿ of banks reset their
loan rates, while a fraction ¿ keep their rates unchanged. The aggregate loan rate
4The interpretation of the price elasticity of demand for di®erentiated goods ² is di®erent. As
² ! 1, the individual goods become closer and closer substitutes. The consequence, however,













t is the newly set loan rate.
A bank that is able to reset in period t chooses the loan rate so as to maximize








As pro¯ts are redeemed to households at the end of each period, the stochastic
discount factor equals the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of a rep-
resentative household. In contrast to households and ¯rms, the optimization is
conditional on the set of information available at time t.5 The banks grant loans
to ¯rms Lt, which are ¯nanced by deposits Dt and central bank credits Bt. Time










The central bank administers the policy rate RM
t , which determines the interest
rate on the interbank money market. The deposit rate RD
t is assumed to equal
the policy rate RM
t due to arbitrage conditions (Freixas and Rochet, 1997, p.
57) and is therefore exogenous for the individual bank. Given the balance sheet
constraint:
Lj;t = Dj;t + Bj;t; (22)
which implies that the loan volume equals the level of deposits { that is chosen
by households { and a cash injection taken up in the form of central bank credits








The maximization of the intertemporal pro¯t function, which is subject to the


















Lt+i = 0; (24)
where RL¤
j;t is the optimal reset price of bank j.
5This assumption is consistent with the identifying restrictions of the VAR model considered
below, according to which the loan rate reacts contemporaneously to a monetary policy shock.
102.4 The Linearized Model
For the empirical analysis we use a log{linearized version of the model, where
the equations are linearized around their steady states. We employ the following
conventions: assume that Xt is a strictly positive variable and ¹ X denotes the
steady state, then the variable ^ Xt is the logarithmic deviation of the variable
from its steady state, ^ Xt = ln(Xt) ¡ ln( ¹ X).












t ¡ ¼t+1 ¡ ^ »t + ^ »t+1); (25)
where the log{linearized income identity ^ Yt = ^ Ct is applied to substitute out
consumption by income. ^ Yt denotes the output gap; the in°ation rate ¼t is de¯ned
as ¼t = ^ Pt ¡ ^ Pt¡1. In the absence of habit formation, i.e. h = 0, equation (25)
collapses to a purely forward{looking IS{equation.
The in°ation adjustment equation is given by a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips
curve that accounts for the cost channel and monopolistic competition in the loan
market:
¼t = °fEt¡1¼t+1 + °b¼t¡1 + ·Et¡1( ^ R
L




µ + ![1 ¡ µ(1 ¡ ¯)]
°b =
!
µ + ![1 ¡ µ(1 ¡ ¯)]
· =
(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¯µ)(1 ¡ !)
µ + ![1 ¡ µ(1 ¡ ¯)]
®³
®³(1 ¡ ²) + ²(³ ¡ 1)
: (27)
The dynamics of the in°ation rate depends on the size of °b in relation to °f, where
it holds that °f + °b = 1. The parameter · is the sensitivity of in°ation with
respect to the gross loan rate ^ RL
t and the real unit labor costs ^ St. The innovation
compared to a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve is the introduction of the
gross loan rate, which implies the existence of a cost channel as deviations of the
nominal gross loan rate from its steady state are a source of cyclical movements
in the in°ation process. Moreover, the slope of the Phillips curve · increases with
the degree of monopolistic competition in the banking sector which is measured
11by 1=³. For values of ³ approaching in¯nity (i.e. perfect competition) the second
fraction of · converges to ®=[1 + (1 ¡ ®)(² ¡ 1)].
The behavior of the banking industry is governed by the following equation


















which can be rewritten as:
¢ ^ R
L
t = ¯Et¢ ^ R
L
t+1 ¡




t ¡ ^ R
M
t ); (29)
where ¢ ^ RL
t = ^ RL
t ¡ ^ RL
t¡1. Equation (29) implies that a change in the average
loan rate is triggered by a wedge between the current money market rate and the
current loan rate. If the fraction of banks ¿ that stick with the last period's loan
rate goes to zero, the pass{through will be complete and ^ RL
t = ^ RM
t at all times
t. This corresponds to the approach taken by Ravenna and Walsh (2006) who
focus on banks operating under perfect competition. If instead ¿ is a positive
fraction, loan rates will respond stickily and the pass{through is incomplete in
the short{run.
Real unit labor costs evolve according to:
^ St =
µ












^ At ¡ ^ »t; (30)
where we used the de¯nition of real unit labor cost ^ St = ^ wt + ^ Nt ¡ ^ Yt and the
log{linearized production technology ^ Yt = ^ At + ® ^ Nt.
The model is closed by the central bank's reaction function. The central bank




t = ± ^ R
M
t¡1 + (1 ¡ ±)[Á¼Et¼t+2 + Á^ Y ^ Yt] + z
M
t ; (31)
where ± captures the degree of interest rate smoothing, Á¼ and Á^ Y are the central
bank's reaction coe±cients with respect to the expected in°ation rate and the
output gap and zM
t denotes the monetary policy shock. The reason for choosing
t+2 as horizon for in°ation expectations is purely empirical as it delivers the best
¯t when the model is estimated for the Euro area. In the following, we concentrate
12on a monetary policy shock only and ignore taste shocks ^ »t and technology shocks
^ At. The main reason for this is that we are interested in investigating the behavior
of banks in propagating monetary policy disturbances.
3 Empirical Results
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005) we estimate the model for the Euro area { the log{linearized equa-
tions (25) to (31) { by using a minimum distance approach that consists of two
steps. First, we estimate a VAR to generate empirical impulse responses to a
monetary policy shock. Second, we estimate the model parameters by matching
the theoretical impulse responses as closely as possible with the empirical impulse
responses.
3.1 Empirical Impulse Responses
We employ a VAR model for the Euro area of the form:
Zt = A(L)Zt¡1 + ¹ + "t; (32)
where Zt is a vector of endogenous variables, ¹ is a vector of constant terms and




where GDPt stands for real output, INFLt for the in°ation rate, RMt for the policy
rate of the central bank, which is approximated by a short{term money market
rate, and RLt for the loan rate.6
The VAR model is estimated in levels. The sample period starts in 1990Q1
and ends in 2002Q4. The output level is expressed in logs, while the in°ation rate
and the interest rates are in percent. The vector of constant terms comprises a
linear trend and a constant. Choosing a lag length of two ensures that the error
terms dismiss signs of autocorrelation and conditional heteroscedasticity.7
6See Appendix C for a description of the data used.
7We ran a variety of tests for misspeci¯cation and stability, which are not reported here, but
which are available upon request.
13Based on the VAR model, we generate impulse responses of the variables
in Zt to a monetary policy shock, which is identi¯ed by imposing a triangular
orthogonalization. The ordering of the variables implies that an innovation in the
policy rate a®ects the output level and the in°ation rate with a lag of one quarter,
while the loan rate is a®ected within the same quarter. Figure 1 displays the
impulse responses of the variables to a one standard deviation monetary policy
shock. The simulation horizon covers 20 quarters. The dotted lines are 95%
Hall percentile con¯dence intervals (Hall, 1992) that are derived from a bootstrap
procedure with 2000 replications. The solid lines denote impulse responses, which
are calculated as the median of the bootstrapped impulse responses. Except for
real GDP, all variables are expressed in units of percentage points at an annual
rate. Real GDP is expressed percent terms.
As in Peersman and Smets (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2002) our ¯nd-
ings show that the output level declines by degrees following a monetary policy
shock, reaching a trough after four quarters, and returns to the baseline value
subsequently. The reaction of the output level corresponds with the evolution
of the output gap. The in°ation rate falls slowly and shows a signi¯cant decline
only after ¯ve quarters. Following the trough, which is reached after around eight
quarters, it gradually reverts to baseline. The money market rate increases imme-
diately, then declines temporally, and returns to the baseline value subsequently.
The loan rate follows a similar pattern as the money market rate, but the reaction
is less pronounced. The sluggish reaction of the loan rate to a monetary policy
shock indicates the incomplete pass{through.
3.2 Methodology
The estimation of our model builds on the following matrix representation:
¡0Xt = ¡1Xt¡1 + ­zzt + ­##t; (33)
where Xt is the state vector, zt is a vector of shocks and #t is a vector of expec-
tational errors that satisfy Et#t+1 = 0 for all t. The matrices ¡0, ¡1, ­z and ­#
contain the structural parameters of the model (Sims, 2001).
The closed loop dynamics of the model, which serves as a starting point to
14Figure 1: Empirical Impulse Responses
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RESP. OF RL TO RM
Notes: Orthogonalized impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. The dotted lines are
95% Hall percentile con¯dence intervals computed from a bootstrap procedure with 2000
replications. The solid lines denote impulse responses, which are calculated as the median of
the bootstrapped impulse responses. The horizontal axis is in quarters.
15generate impulse responses, is given by:
Xt(%) = £X(%)Xt¡1 + £z(%)zt; (34)
where the rational expectations equilibrium is solved by using the method devel-
oped by Sims (2001).8 For the matching of the impulse responses, we estimate
the following set of parameters:
% = (h µ ! ¿ ± Á¼ Á^ Y);
by minimizing a distance measure between the theoretical impulse responses and
the empirical impulse responses.
The remaining parameters were calibrated according to estimates typically
found in the literature (see Table 1). The discount factor ¯ is ¯xed to 0.99,
implying an annual steady state interest rate of 4 per cent. The degree of risk
aversion ¾ (which is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution)
is assumed to equal one, which corresponds to the assumption of a log utility
function (see for example Del Negro et al., 2005, for a similar assumption). The
values for the share of labor in production ® and the elasticity of labor supply ´
are set in accordance with the mean values of the prior distribution in Del Negro
et al. (2005). The steady{state mark{up of intermediate good producers over
nominal marginal costs is set at 20 per cent, implying ² = 6. This value for ²
is somewhat higher than in Del Negro et al. (2005) (² = 4:33), but lower than
for example in Leith and Malley (2005) (² = 11). The steady{state mark{up of
the banking industry is set at 40 per cent (³ = 3:5) and has been calculated as
the average percentage deviation of the nominal loan rate RLt from the nominal
money market rate RMt over the sample period.
The need for calibrating a sub{set of parameters is typically encountered in
the literature when DSGE models are estimated. One reason for this is that in
an unconstrained estimate these parameters often take values that are implausi-
ble. The decision of which parameters to calibrate, however, is rarely discussed
and varies from paper to paper. We therefore propose to distinguish calibrated
from estimated parameters by their role for the dynamics of the economy. While
8We used the MATLAB ¯les gensys.m, gensysct.m, qzdiv.m, qzdivct.m, and qzswitch.m,
which can be downloaded from Chris Sims's web page.
16Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Symbol Calibration
Discount factor ¯ 0.99
Risk aversion ¾ 1.00
Labor supply elasticity ´ 2.00
Production function ® 0.75
Monopoly power of ¯rms 1=² 1/6
Monopoly power of banks 1=³ 1/3.5
the calibrated parameters fully determine the evolution of the °exible price equi-
librium of the economy (which takes into account the monopoly power of ¯rms
in the intermediate goods market and of the banking industry), the estimated
parameters re°ect the ine±ciencies resulting from real rigidities (h) and nominal
frictions (µ, !, ¿) and the related policy response (±, Á¼, Á^ Y).
The estimator of % minimizes the following distance function (Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005):
J =
³





^ ª ¡ ª(%)
´
; (35)
where ^ ª denote the empirical impulse responses, ª(%) describe the mapping from
% to the theoretical impulse responses and V is the weighting matrix with the
sample variances of ^ ª on the diagonal. The weighting matrix assures that those
point estimates with a smaller standard deviation are given a higher priority.9
3.3 Minimum Distance Estimation
We estimate our model by matching impulse responses to a monetary policy
shock. The impulse responses are plotted in Figure 2 together with the 95% error
9We used the MATLAB optimization routine fminunc, which attempts to ¯nd a minimum of
a scalar function of several variables, starting at an initial estimate. This is generally referred to
as unconstrained nonlinear optimization. The algorithm uses the BFGS Quasi-Newton method
with a mixed quadratic and cubic line search procedure. A limitation of the algorithm is that it
might only give local solutions. Therefore, we checked whether our estimates are robust against
the choice of the initial estimate %0 = (0:8 0:8 0:8 0:5 0:8 1:5 0:8). Furthermore, as a crucial
prerequisite for the reliability of the estimates we took care that the optimization algorithm
converges.
17bands. The theoretical impulse responses conform quite closely with the empirical
impulse responses and lie in general within the con¯dence intervals. The model
replicates reasonably well the humped{shaped response of output, the progressive
drop in in°ation and the response of the interest rates. Solely slight di®erences
emerge in the timing of the troughs of output and in°ation, which are reached
earlier.
Figure 2: Model Impulse Responses
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Simulated RL
Estimated RL
Notes: For the estimated impulse responses see notes to Figure 1.
Table 2 summarizes the point estimates of the parameters in the vector % that
minimize the distance function.10 The standard errors for ^ % are computed using
10For a check of the robustness of the estimates against changes in the calibrated parameters
see Appendix D.
18Table 2: Parameter Estimates
Parameter Symbol Estimate Standard error
Habit formation h 0.89 0.02
Price stickiness µ 0.67 0.15
Rule-of-thumb pricing ! 0.90 0.04
Loan rate stickiness ¿ 0.36 0.05
Taylor rule: smoothing ± 0.73 0.06
Taylor rule: in°ation Á¼ 1.07 0.20
Taylor rule: output gap Á^ Y -0.13 0.14
the delta function method.11 Concerning the Taylor rule, we ¯nd that interest
rate smoothing is important, that the output gap turns out to be insigni¯cant
and that the central bank reacts positively to the expected in°ation rate in t+2.
In the consumption Euler{equation the estimated degree of habit formation is
substantial and indicates that the hump shaped response in the output gap to a
monetary policy shock seems to be mainly driven by habits itself. This estimate
appears to validate the claim of Rudebusch and Fuhrer (2005) that the degree of
forward{lookingness in consumption is limited. This ¯nding is in line with other
studies that do not account for the capital formation process explicitly (Giannoni
and Woodford, 2004, Nelson, Andr¶ es and L¶ opez-Salido, 2005).
11This footnote is taken from Altig et al. (2005). Let g(^ %; ^ ª) = J^ %(^ %; ^ ª) = 0 denote the ¯rst
order condition associated with the solution to the minimization of (35). Denote the mapping
in (35) by ^ % = f(^ ª). To obtain the sampling variance of the estimator, ^ %, as a function of the
sampling variance of ^ ª, the delta function method approximates f(^ ª) by its linear expansion
about the true value of ª, ª0. That is, f(^ ª) ¼ f(ª0) + f0(ª0)(^ ª ¡ ª0). Here, f(ª0) = %0,
where %0 is the true value of %, by the consistency of our estimator. Then,
p
N(^ %N ¡ %0)
is asymptotically Normally distributed with mean zero and variance f0(ª0)Wf0(ª0)T, where
N is the number of bootstraps used in the calculation of the empirical impulse responses, T
indicates the transposition operator, and W is the asymptotic variance{covariance matrix of p
N(^ ªN ¡ª0). We use the implicit function theorem to approximate f0(ª0) by ¡g
¡1
1 g2, where
g1 and g2 are the partial derivatives of g with respect to % and ª, evaluated at %0 and ª0.
In practice, W is replaced by its sample estimate, as are %0 and ª0 in the expression for f0.
The standard errors reported in Table 2 are the relevant diagonal terms in f0(ª0)Wf0(ª0)T,
after taking square roots and dividing by
p
N. Note that the weighting matrix V in (35) is a
diagonal matrix composed of the diagonal elements of W. For the calculation of the standard
errors we used modi¯ed versions of the MATLAB ¯les ComputeStdErrors.m, g1g2Func.m, and
MomentFunction.m, which can be downloaded from Lawrence Christiano's web page.
19The estimated degree of Calvo pricing implies that prices are ¯xed on average
for three quarters. This is in line with the estimates for µ that can be found in
Del Negro et al. (2005) (µ = 0:67) and Rabanal (2003) (µ = 0:64). The estimate
for rule-of-thumb price setting ! is somewhat higher compared to other studies,
which might re°ect the fact that we do not explicitly allow for indexation in the
wage formation process.
The signi¯cant estimate for ¿ reveals that the banking industry plays a mean-
ingful role in propagating monetary shocks. The degree of loan rate stickiness
¿ was estimated to be 0.36, which implies that loan rates are ¯xed on average
for 1.5 quarters. This result can be considered as a contribution to the literature
as we extend earlier ¯ndings by Ravenna and Walsh (2006) who only model the
banking industry as a neutral conveyor of monetary shocks. Their model of the
banking industry can be regarded as a special case of our model with ¿ = 0.
4 Relevance of the Structure of the Banking
System for the Cost Channel
The estimates reported in the last section reveal that the macroeconomic rele-
vance of the cost channel for the Euro area is determined by the institutional
structure of the ¯nancial system. On the one hand, the degree to which changes
in the money market rate are passed through to the loan rate depends on the
Calvo parameter ¿, which measures the fraction of banks in each period that
keep their loan rates unchanged. Moreover, since banks are forward{looking and
their decisions are a®ected by their expectations about future monetary policy,
the interest rate pass{through also depends on the policy rule parameters. On the
other hand, the impact of the loan rate on in°ation is determined by the slope of
the Phillips curve, which depends { among other structural parameters { on the
importance of banker{customer relationships and hence on the degree of compe-
tition in the banking industry ³. In the following we will discuss the relevance of
these parameters for the transmission of monetary impulses to in°ation via the
cost channel.
204.1 Pass{Through from the Money Market Rate to the
Loan Rate
For the analysis of the impact of ¿ and the policy rule parameters on the interest
rate pass{through we simplify our model by excluding any feedback from in°ation









Thus, the modi¯ed reaction function (36) and equation (28) form a system of
expectational di®erence equations for ^ RM
t and ^ RL
t with zM
t as an exogenous mon-
etary policy shock, for which the minimum{state{variable (MSV) rational ex-
pectations solution (McCallum, 1983) for ^ RL
t can be computed analytically (see
Appendix E for a derivation):
^ R
L
t = ¿ ^ R
L
t¡1 +





A Calvo{type staggered price setting approach on the part of the banking
industry nests the following implications for the interest rate pass{through:
Proposition 4.1 The immediate pass{through of a monetary policy shock zM
t to
the loan rate ^ RL
t becomes more incomplete when the fraction of banks ¿ that stick
to last period's loan rates rises.
Proof The immediate pass{through refers to the pass{through in the period in
which the monetary policy shock zM
t hits the banking industry. Thus, as time
t ¡ 1 variables are at their zero{steady{state, ^ RM
t = zM
t and ^ RL
t = f(¯;±;¿) ^ RM
t
where the immediate pass{through coe±cient is given by f(¯;±;¿) =
(1¡¯¿)(1¡¿)
(1¡¯¿±) .
The ¯rst derivative of the immediate pass{through coe±cient f with respect to ¿
is given by f¿(¯;±;¿) =
¡¯±¿2+2¯¿+(¯±¡¯¡1)
(1¡¯¿±)2 . The sign of f¿(¯;±;¿) is determined
by the nominator, which is for ¯;± 2]0;1] a downward{opening parabola with two




¯± . It can be shown by straightforward algebra
that the smaller of the two roots is strictly larger than one, if ± < 1=¯, which is
always true. As a consequence, f¿(¯;±;¿) is strictly negative for ¿ 2 [0;1] and
¯;± 2]0;1].
21Thus, according to Proposition 4.1, the immediate interest rate pass{through is
mainly determined by ¿. In particular, for a bank{based system we conjecture
that the immediate interest rate pass{through is incomplete, which is con¯rmed
by our point estimate of ¿ = 0:36. In the case of a market{based system ¿
should be signi¯cantly smaller and close to zero. Note that for the limiting case
of ¿ = 0, the model collapses towards a regime of complete interest rate pass{
through (Ravenna and Walsh, 2006), where the money market rate ^ RM
t equals
the loan rate ^ RM
t at each point in time t.
For the central bank's impact on the immediate pass{through the following
proposition holds:
Proposition 4.2 The immediate pass{through of a monetary policy shock zM
t
to the loan rate ^ RL
t becomes less incomplete when the central bank's smoothing
parameter ± rises.
Proof The ¯rst derivative of the immediate pass{through coe±cient f with
respect to ±, f±(¯;±;¿) =
(1¡¯¿)(1¡¿)¯¿
(1¡¯¿±)2 , is greater than or equal to zero for
¯;±;¿ 2 [0;1].
Thus, according to Proposition 4.2, an interest rate smoothing central bank re-
duces the initial incompleteness of the pass{through and works against the loan
rate stickiness of the banking industry. Note, however, that ^ RL
t will always be
smaller than ^ RM
t in the period in which the monetary policy shock zM
t hits the
banking industry (i.e. the immediate pass{through will always be incomplete), as
0 · f(¯;±;¿) < 1 for all ¯;± 2 [0;1] and ¿ 2]0;1].12 Thus, the main determinant
of the immediate pass{through is the degree of loan rate stickiness ¿.
For the periods following the shock the stickiness of the loan rate is also an
important determinant of the pass{through:
Proposition 4.3 The adjustment process of ^ RL
t to ^ RM
t becomes more persistent
when the fraction of banks ¿ that stick to last period's loan rates rises.
Proof The role of ¿ for the adjustment process is harder to grasp using analytical
methods. For this reason we resort to a graphical proof. Figure 3 shows that for a
value of ± equal to 0:73 the incompleteness of the pass{through, ^ RL
t ¡ ^ RM
t , becomes
12The immediate pass{through is complete only for ¿ = 0.
22more persistent following a monetary policy shock when the degree of loan rate
stickiness ¿ increases. As a byproduct Figure 3 also illustrates Proposition 4.1.
Note that the dynamic laws of motion of ^ RM
t and ^ RL
t are given by equations (36)
and (37).


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































t , but also that of ^ RL
t :
Proposition 4.4 The adjustment process of ^ RL
t to ^ RM
t becomes more persistent
when the degree of interest rate smoothing ± rises.
Proof Again we resort to a graphical proof. Figure 4 shows that for ¿ = 0:36 the
incompleteness of the pass{through, ^ RL
t ¡ ^ RM
t , becomes more persistent following
23a monetary policy shock when the degree of interest rate smoothing on the part of
the central bank ± increases. As a byproduct Figure 4 also illustrates Proposition
4.2.
Figure 4: Proof of Proposition 4.4











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2 Impact of the Loan Rate on In°ation
Apart from the pass{through of the money market rate to the loan rate the
macroeconomic relevance of the cost channel depends on the slope coe±cient of
the Phillips curve ·, which represents the elasticity of in°ation with respect to
real marginal costs. Concerning the impact of the competitive structure of the
¯nancial system on · the following proposition can be formulated:
24Proposition 4.5 A higher degree of competition in the banking industry ³ de-
creases the slope coe±cient · of the Phillips curve. The macroeconomic impor-
tance of the cost channel, however, remains unchanged as the aggregate demand
channel, which counteracts the cost channel through its impact on real unit labor
costs, is a®ected in equal measure.
Proof The second fraction in equation (27), which we denote by g(®;²;³) =
®³
®³(1¡²)+²(³¡1), is a decreasing function of ³.13
Thus, if the prevalence of relationship banking diminishes and if, as a consequence,
the banking industry becomes more competitive (i.e. ³ ! 1), the impact of real
marginal costs on in°ation declines. In Figure 5 the response of real marginal
costs ^ 't to a monetary policy shock for the model estimated in Section 3 is
decomposed into into its two constituents, the loan rate ^ RL
t and real unit labor
costs ^ St. On the one hand, it shows that the traditional aggregate demand channel
induces consumers to reallocate consumption into the future following a restrictive
monetary policy shock, which reduces current demand for goods. As production
decisions are demand determined, ¯rms induce production cuts by reducing labor
input, which in turn curtails real marginal costs. On the other hand, the banking
industry passes through the increase in the money market rate to the loan rate.
In sum, the initial decrease in real unit labor costs is partially compensated by the
increase in the loan rate. However, as the degree of competition in the banking
industry ³ neither in°uences the dynamics of ^ RL
t nor that of ^ St, the relative
importance of the cost channel remains una®ected by changes in ·.
4.3 Cost Channel versus Aggregate Demand Channel
Figure 5 also illustrates that for the Euro area the demand channel e®ect domi-
nates the cost channel e®ect by a large margin. Thus, on the basis of our estimates
presented in Section 3 we conclude that the cost channel is not strong enough to
be of quantitative importance. This ¯nding is in line with Rabanal (2003) who
estimated a small{scale macroeconomic model for the United States and the Euro
13Note that g(®;²;³) is discontinuous. Even though g³(®;²;³) = ¡ ®²
(®³(1¡²)+²(³¡1))2 < 0 for
all ³ 2]¡1;1[ and ®;² > 0, ³ has to be larger than ²
®+²¡®² > 0 so as to ensure that g(®;²;³),
and hence ·, is positive.
25Figure 5: Decomposition of Real Marginal Costs






{±{ Et¡1 ^ RL
t {+{ Et¡1 ^ St {M{ Et¡1 ^ 't
area that accounts for the cost channel. In his model banks operate under perfect
competition. Contrary to other papers, he divides ¯rms into a fraction that must
pay workers before they sell their product and a remaining fraction of ¯rms that
pays the wage bill at the end of the period. Although he ¯nds evidence of the
cost channel in both countries, he concludes that the estimated fraction of cost
channel ¯rms is quantitatively unimportant.
There are three factors that would contribute to an increase in the relative
importance of the cost channel. The ¯rst is related to the the degree of loan rate
stickiness, and hence to the institutional structure of the banking system. If ¿
decreases, the pass{through becomes more complete as the banking system's role
as a damper of monetary impulses vanishes. In the extreme case of ¿ = 0, the
loan rate exactly follows the money market rate and the cost channel e®ect is
maximal, whereas the evolution of real unit labor costs remains una®ected. A
quanti¯cation of the increase in the relative importance of the cost channel after
the modi¯cation of a single parameter is shown in Figure 6. For the ¯rst four
quarters following the monetary policy shock the bars depict by how much the
loan rate counteracts the impact of real unit labor costs on real marginal costs.
Speci¯cally, for t = 1;2;3;4 each bar is calculated as (^ 't=^ St ¡ 1) ¢ 100%. In the
case of ¿ = 0, the largest impact can be recorded for t = 1, in which the loan rate
26increases marginal costs by 16% instead of 13% in the case of ¿ = 0:36.
Figure 6: Increasing the Relative Importance of the Cost Channel















A second way to increase the relative importance of the cost channel is to
allow for a more than complete initial pass{through. This line has been taken
by Chowdhury, Ho®mann, and Schabert (2006) who { instead of providing an
explicit microfoundation { postulate the following static relationship between the
money market rate and the loan rate: ^ RL
t = (1+Ã) ^ RM
t . A positive Ã is motivated
by \¯nancial market imperfections", which basically represent the costs that are
related to the likelihood of defaults on loans.14 Figure 6 shows that in the case
of Ã = 0:5 the ampli¯cation of the monetary impulse reduces marginal costs
signi¯cantly stronger than in the complete{pass{through case.
A more persistent e®ect can also be attained by an increase in the habit
formation parameter h. As this diminishes the impact of monetary policy on real
unit labor costs St, the demand channel is weakened without having any impact
on the cost channel. Figure 6 shows that in the case of h = 0:98 the reduction of
real marginal costs by the loan rate only phases out gradually and still amounts
to ¡11% in period four following the monetary policy shock.
14Note that in our simple model we abstain from modeling capital accumulation. Hence,
by rationalizing a more than complete pass{through by the existence of risky investments, we
would clearly abandon our general equilibrium framework.
275 Conclusion
The cost channel assigns banks an important role in the transmission of monetary
policy by stating that ¯rms require credit to ¯nance production. Firms base their
pricing decision on credit conditions because their marginal production costs are
directly a®ected by interest rates. As a consequence, the drop in prices following
a monetary contraction is mitigated as credit conditions deteriorate with higher
interest rates.
We presented a New Keynesian model that dwells on the role of banks in the
cost channel of monetary policy. Banks were assumed to extent credit to ¯rms
in an environment of monopolistic competition by setting the loan rate according
to a Calvo{type staggered price setting approach. Only a fraction of banks reset
their loan rate after a change in the policy rate, while the remaining fraction kept
their loan rate unchanged, which implied that the adjustment of the aggregate
loan rate to a monetary policy shock is sluggish.
We estimated a VAR model for the Euro area, which showed that output
declines by degrees after a monetary policy shock, in°ation reacts inertial and the
loan rate follows the policy rate, but the reaction is less pronounced. The latter
con¯rms the ¯ndings of de Bondt (2005), according to which the pass-through
from money market rates to loan rates is incomplete.
For an assessment of the relevance of the cost channel in the Euro area, we
estimated our general equilibrium model by adopting a minimum distance ap-
proach, which matches the theoretical impulse responses to the empirical impulse
responses to a monetary policy shock. The results showed that, (i) frictions on
the loan market play a meaningful part for the propagation of monetary pol-
icy shocks, as the adjustment of loan rates to changes in money market rates is
sticky, and (ii) the cost channel is operating, but the e®ect is weak since in°ation
is mainly driven by changes in unit labor costs rather than interest rates.
Our main conclusion was that the strength of the cost channel in the Euro
area is mitigated as banks shelter ¯rms from monetary policy shocks by smoothing
lending rates. Although ¯rms base their pricing decision on credit conditions, the
impact on in°ation dynamics arising through changes in interest rates emerges
as quantitatively unimportant. This is consistent with Christiano, Eichenbaum,
28and Evans (2005) and Rabanal (2003), who conclude that the overall e®ect of the
cost channel is only minor.
29Appendices
A Derivation of the Firms' Real Marginal Costs
When the production of intermediate good producers is subject to diminishing
returns to scale (® < 1) and when ¯rms maintain long{term business relationships
with speci¯c banks, ¯rms with di®erent production levels face di®erent marginal


























The ¯rst term in parentheses can be replaced by (Lj;t+i=Lt+i)1=³ when making use
of equation (18). Recall that loans Lj;t+i are taken up for paying the wage bill
Wt+iNj;t+i. Thus, Lj;t+i=Lt+i can be replaced by Nj;t+i=Nt+i. Using the de¯nition
of real unit labor costs Sj;t+i given by equation (16), the second term in paren-
theses can be rewritten as (Nj;t+i=Nt+i)(Yt+i=Yj;t+i). After substituting out labor








Equation (7) can ¯nally be used to replace the term in parentheses, so that we
end up with equation (17) of the main text.
B Loan Rate Evolution
Banks face frictions as in Calvo (1983), which implies a staggered price setting.
The loan rate RL
t evolves each period as a weighted average of a fraction of banks
1¡¿ that are allowed to reoptimize the loan rate and a fraction ¿ that stick with
30the last period loan rate RL






























j;t denotes the reoptimized loan rate. Forward{looking bank j sets its































= (1 ¡ ¿¯) ^ R
M
t + ¯¿Et ^ R
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t+1:
















































The data is taken from the Euro Area Wide Model (AWM) { see Fagan, Henry,
and Mestre (2001) and www.ecb.org { except for the loan rate data, which has
been kindly provided by the ECB. The sample covers the period from 1990Q1 to
2002Q4 due to the availability of the loan rate data.
311. GDP: Log of real GDP, seasonally adjusted (AWM code: YER).
2. INFL: In°ation rate, annualized change of GDP de°ator in percent, season-
ally adjusted (AWM code: YED).
3. RM: Short{term nominal interest rate, in percent (AWM code: STN).
4. RL: Retail bank lending rates to enterprizes; average of rates up to one year
and over one year, nominal in percent.
D Robustness of the Estimates
When a subset of model parameters is calibrated, an important matter is whether
the estimates of the remaining model parameters are robust against changes in
the calibrated parameters. In the literature there is above all uncertainty about
the values for ¾, ², ® and ´, whereas ¯ is always set to values close to 0.99.15
Instead of assuming log-utility (as in Del Negro et al., 2005) Leith and Malley
(2005), for instance, estimate the degree of risk aversion ¾ and report values for
the Euro area close to 2. Concerning the steady-state mark-up in the intermediate
goods market a number of papers (e.g. Leith and Malley, 2005, and Welz, 2006)
assume a value of 10 per cent (² = 11). There are, however, several authors that
assume a signi¯cantly higher mark-up. Amato and Laubach (2003), for instance,
set it to 15 per cent (² = 7:9), and Del Negro et al. (2005) even set it to 23 per
cent (² = 4:3). The elasticity of marginal disutility of labor ´ and the share of
labor in production ® were also calibrated by Leith and Malley (2005) who set
them to 1.5 and 0.68, respectively. Del Negro et al. (2005), by contrast, included
these two parameters in their vector of estimates and obtained values of 2.3 and
0.85, respectively.
The most important result is that the degree of loan rate stickiness ¿ is very
robust against the chosen values of those parameters that determine the evolution
of the °exible{price equilibrium of the economy. Irrespective of the calibration
of ¾, ², ® and ´, the estimate of ¿ lies in the close neighborhood of our baseline
estimate of 0.36 (see Figures 7 to 10).
15The steady{state mark{up of the banking industry 1=(³¡1) was calculated using observable
data (see Section 3.2) and is therefore not subject to uncertainty.
32Figure 7: Robustness of the Estimates against Variations of ¾


















































Notes: Missing values occur when the optimization routine does not converge.
33Figure 8: Robustness of the Estimates against Variations of ²




















































34Figure 9: Robustness of the Estimates against Variations of ®




















































Notes: Missing values occur when the optimization routine does not converge.





















































36As for the remaining parameter estimates, the following results can be stated.
The inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption ¾ mainly in°uences the
estimate of the habit formation parameter h and the policy rule parameters ±, Á^ Y
and Á¼, which all decrease with a higher value of ¾ (see Figure 7). Changes in ²
only have an impact on the price setting behavior of intermediate good producers.
With a higher steady{state mark{up (a lower ²), both the degree of price stickiness
µ and the fraction of rule{of{thumb price setters ! increases (see Figure 8). The
production function parameter ® mainly in°uences the price setting behavior and
the reaction of the central bank. A higher share of labor in production (i.e. a
higher value of ®) increases the degree of price stickiness µ and the fraction of
rule{of{thumb price setters ! and deceases the response of the central bank to
deviations of expected in°ation and output from their steady state values (see
Figure 9). Changes in ´ only have an impact on the estimates of the policy rule
parameters ±, Á^ Y and Á¼, which all turn out to be increasing in ´ (see Figure 10).
E Derivation of the MSV Solution
After excluding any feedback from in°ation and output on the central bank's
reaction function (i.e. Á¼ = Á^ Y = 0 in equation (31)), our model can be reduced
to the following system of expectational di®erence equations for ^ RM
t and ^ RL
t with
zM





























t = Á1 ^ R
L
t¡1 + Á2 ^ R
M
t¡1; (E.3)
where the coe±cients Á1 and Á2 remain to be determined. Eliminating the en-
dogenous variable Et ^ RL
t+1 in (E.1) by Et ^ RL
t+1 = EtÁ1 ^ RL
t +EtÁ2 ^ RM
t+1, and equating
coe±cients by comparing the resulting expression with (E.1) leads to the following




1 ¡ Á1 +
¿





1 + ¯¿2)(Á1 + ±)
¶
¡
(1 ¡ ¯¿)(1 ¡ ¿)
1 + ¯¿2 = 0: (E.5)
Computing the stable root of Á1 in (E.4) yields: Á1 = ¿. Inserting Á1 = ¿ into
(E.5) gives a solution for Á2, with Á2 =
(1¡¯¿)(1¡¿)
1+¯¿± . Making use of these results in
(E.3), the MSV solution can be stated as:
^ R
L
t = ¿ ^ R
L
t¡1 +





which is equivalent to equation (37).
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